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Abstract. In this paper we argue that the business model underlying the new economy is based on the
following interrelated and self-reinforcing forces:
1. The development of a new strategy of opportunity, which focuses on the use of creative innovation
to open up new market spaces, rather than using exploitive innovation to prolong the life of
existing products.
2. The democratization of competition thanks to the Internet and to process outsourcing.
3. Taken together, these forces result in a profound shift in the source of value creation in firms
from processes and physical assets to people.
With the drivers of business success so fundamentally transformed, almost all aspects of the
firm and its management also need to change, from valuation, resource allocation and worker
compensation, to what it takes to retain workers and promote innovation. But while the rules of
business have changed, there has not been a corresponding shift in awareness among most managers.
Assuming that there is nothing new in the New Economy is a profound and dangerous mistake.
Managers that are so short sighted will find that they have not only lost out on the opportunities that
the new economy continues to provide, but that the market downturn has only deferred, rather than
eliminated, the threats that change poses to their firms.
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1. LAST RITES FOR THE NEW ECONOMY?
Just a few years ago, an article on the New Economy such as this would have
started with a breathless description about the massive amounts of wealth that it
had created. Today, it is equally impossible to avoid mentioning the stunning
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market losses since the dotcom meltdown of the summer of 2000. It turns out that
the long stock market boom was nothing compared to the fastest and greatest
“correction” in history.
A statement by Mike Moore (2000, page 43) of “Crossing the Chasm” fame
best expressed the prevailing sentiment in those halcyon days: “Stock price is the
foundation of the New Economy.” When that was written it was not only meant to
herald the birth of the new economy but also to be a self-congratulatory cry of
triumph for the age of NASDAQ, IPOs and day traders. With most of the Internet
firms lauded at the time now bankrupt, Moore’s comment today has the ring of an
epitaph. Dotcom has become a word to be shunned, as investors flock back to
established old economy firms—the same “notcoms” once widely dismissed as
dinosaurs doomed to extinction from “new, new thing” startups.1
The problem with having used stock price as the metric of success for new
economy firms is that when the price fell the obvious conclusion drawn was that
there was really nothing of substance there in the first place. Given the trillions of
dollars that investors have lost it is not surprising that there is now a sense of
caution about new economy firms. But there is also the danger that the backlash
against “irrational exuberance” will be an equally misguided belief that there is
really nothing new in the new economy.2
No less a figure than Michael Porter (2001) recently pronounced that: “I
believe that the experiences companies have had with the internet thus far must
be largely discounted and that many of the lessons learned must be forgottenÉ
even the phrases “new economy” and “old economy” are rapidly losing their
relevance, if they ever had any.” There is undoubtedly a virtue in scaling back
expectations about the possibilities for firm success and reemphasizing the need
for profitability and a workable strategy. But what is overlooked in the “told you
so” arguments heard so often lately is that the key change brought about by the
new economy is not in how firms use strategy to translate potential value into
profits, but in how that value is created in the first place.
We argue in this paper that assuming that there is nothing new in the new
economy is a profound and dangerous mistake. Firms that are so short sighted
will find they have not only lost out on the opportunities that this economy provides,
but that the market correction has only deferred, rather than eliminated, the threats
that change poses to them. The fact is that there really is something unique about
1
 See for example, Lewis (1999), Hamel (1999) and Sahlman (1999)—or any issue, up to May 2000, of Fast
Company, Industry Standard, or Business 2.0.
2
 Shiller (2000).
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the drivers of the new economy, and they will continue to radically transform
businesses in the 21st century.
Despite the corrections to an overheated market for technology firms, the one
word that captures the new economy is opportunity. The new economy consists of
firms pursuing a novel strategy of seeking opportunities to create new markets,
using the creative talent of their people. At least until the recent round of layoffs, it
was fashionable for firms to talk of recognizing that people are their number one
resource. But that was more a reaction to tight labor markets than to a true
understanding of the profound shifts that have taken place in what firms do and
how they do it. What we show in this article is that the new economy consists of a
set of forces whose most important effect is to shift the source of value creation in
firms from assets and processes to people. And when that happens, the key variable
that managers have to focus on is the opportunity cost of their employees’ time.
Leading Silicon Valley firms, led by innovators like Cisco Systems, have
started to internalize the implications of being in an Opportunity Economy by the
development of such innovative management tools as the “spin-in”. But most
other firms have yet to fully recognize how much the rules of the game have
changed from the old economy to the new. With the market correction reducing
the immediate threat of competition from startups, many established firms will
inevitably conclude that they have less reason to change. Some may even feel
vindicated for sticking with “tried and true” ways and indeed, when the recession
came, many firms abandoned their new found appreciation of their employees in
favor of cost cutting.
In this paper we counter the backlash against the irrational exuberance that
accompanied the rise of the new economy by identifying what was truly new and
lasting about it. Ironically the economic downturn increases the value of our
analysis for managers of established firms, for the demise of many of their startup
competitors gives them a second chance to adopt the policies that will enable
them to succeed in the new economy. But first managers of both established and
startup firms have to understand that their concept of how firm’s create value has
been fundamentally transformed.
We begin our discussion of the strategy of opportunity that underlies the new
economy in section 2 of the paper. We then introduce the building blocks of our
new business model, with creative and exploitive innovations discussed in section
3 and process outsourcing in section 4, which, together, result in the fundamental
shift in the source of value creation from assets and processes to people, as we
argue in section 5. Section 6 then examines the implications of the new business
model for firm valuation, human resources policies and management control
systems. Section 7 offers concluding comments.
2. A STRATEGY OF SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES
The most obvious characterization of the new economy is that it is all about
technology. From a longer perspective, though, technological advances have been
taking place regularly over the last two centuries, sometimes more rapidly and
profoundly than today. What is different now is that the technology that virtually
defines the new economy, the Internet, is an innovation unlike any that has preceded
it. The distinctive characteristic of the Internet is that it is a great leveler: the
startup costs for having a significance presence on the web are low, both in absolute
terms and relative to the potential value creation.3  The lower entry costs mean
that in cyberspace everyone can potentially look equally attractive and credible
and have equal access to all customers everywhere, with the latest entrant having
a presence as significant as the oldest and largest firm. Distance, size, history,
none of these matters.4
It is this egalitarian aspect that makes the Internet unique as far as the impact
of technology on business is concerned. Prior technological advances, such as
electricity, automobiles and the telephone also had a large effect on industry.5 But
apart from for the firms directly involved in their manufacture, for most businesses
these advances were only a means of more easily doing what they were already
doing. In other words, they only addressed how firms did things, not what they
did or why. The Internet is different because it is not just a technological tool, but
also an arena for competition, and so fundamentally alters not just a firm’s
production function but also its strategic environment.6
With the collapse of e-commerce, in particular, there has been a shift towards
seeing the major impact of the Internet as improving the efficiency of existing large
firms.7 While the benefits of the Internet as an internal control and communication
device cannot be underestimated, it is premature to dismiss the Internet as simply a
means of cost reduction. Doing business on the Internet has effects beyond simply
saving money—it fundamentally shapes firm culture and strategy.
3
 For example, GE spent only $15,000 on the auction software for its internal B2B site. Cisco spent $50
million upfront for its Cisco Online site and plans to spend ten million annually on upkeep—but the cost
savings are over $530 million each and every year (Vasarhelyi, 2000).
4
 See “Tricks of the Trade: New tool can make even a small web site look bold, big and beautiful”, Newsweek
(E-Life Special Issue, pp. 53-56, July 2000).
5
 Gordon (2000).
6
 An excellent summary of these characteristics of the Internet is provided in the special report on E-Management
in the November 11th, 2000 issue of the Economist.
7
 Porter (2001). See also “New Economy: Old-School Rigor”, New York Times (June 12th, 2000).
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For decades, firm strategy consisted of leveraging a core competency in cost
or quality. But differentiating on these dimensions are essentially ways of
competing in an existing market where established competitors seek to stand out
from each other. By contrast, the essence of the new economy is the creation of
new markets through the seizing of opportunities and the development of
innovative products and services that have not existed before.8
Of course, there have always been new product introductions. But what is
special about this economy is that innovation has become not just a means of
supporting an existing strategy, but a strategy in its own right. Technology has
reached a critical stage at which it can create demand rather than responding to
existing needs.9 Innovation also creates opportunities for complementary or next
generation product, thus allowing the strategy to feed on and sustain itself. For
example, the development of Internet based e-commerce spawned the creation of
whole industries in e-commerce consulting, marketing, site development and the
“electronization” of firms in general. Most important of all, the Internet is leading
to the rise of networks as the dominant paradigm for both competition and
organizational architecture. This stimulates whole new areas for innovation, from
the enablers of the networks—the related hardware, software, communication
tools and the integration of it all—to the opportunities this will provide for new
products, services and markets.10 Of course, it is inevitable that many ideas, perhaps
even the best ones, will fall by the wayside. But that is the process of creative
destruction that drives capitalism, not an indication that opportunities are lacking
or that innovation is dying out, as some seem to have concluded lately.
The openness of investors to the potential of small firms and the desire for
established firms to keep pace with innovation also leads firms in the new economy
8
 For example, in EMC Corporation up to 80% of annual revenues comes from products introduced that same
year (Austin, Nolan and Cotteleer, 2001; Hemp, 2001). The special issue of Journal of Management Information
Systems (2000), Vol. 16, n.4, discusses the impact of information technology investment on organizational
performance.
9
 For example, consider the GPS satellite system. While it has been in place for twenty years, only in the last
few years has it had a major impact on the non-defense sector. In the future it may well spawn a whole host of
new industries, from an air-traffic control system independent of ground controllers to order tracking for
supply chain management as well as consumer products for hikers, golfers and drivers. See “Satellites Guiding
Industries on the Move”, New York Times, September 28, 1998:“Thousands of American companies are
putting global positioning satellite data to work for such commercial purposes as mapping delivery routes,
tracking products from factory to retail shelf and monitoring whereabouts of mobile workers; many businesses
now consider GPS technology a utility like the Internet; Commerce Department estimates worldwide GPS
equipment sales will reach $4 billion this year and $16 billion by 2003”
10
 Tapscott, Ticoll and Lowy (2000), Suarez-Villa (1998).
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to have a strategy option that never existed before: create companies in the
expectation that they will be acquired. While few VC firms will say that they
invest in a startup “built to flip,” the fact remains that in some industries—
especially in networking, thanks to the lead of Cisco Systems—being acquired is
a perfectly desirable exit strategy.11 Clearly the tactics of managers in such a firm
is going to be different from that of someone who plans to build a company that
will grow and last for generations, like the family companies of the old economy.
Such opportunistic startups are often led by that phenomenon of the new economy,
the serial entrepreneur. Essentially firms such as these are following a strategy of
outsourcing innovation for established companies, and as such, their real customers
are potential acquirers, not end consumers. In many ways, we would argue that
the market acceptance of the build to acquire strategy has been essential to the
growth of the new economy. It allows entrepreneurs to specialize on only the
startup phase of a business as opposed to having to also develop and demonstrate
the quite different skills needed to run a larger company (hence, the emergence of
the new field of entrepreneurship in business schools). It also allows startups to
obtain funding at the idea stage, deferring planning for growing the company.
3. PUTTING THE OPPORTUNITY STRATEGY INTO
PRACTICE: CREATIVE AND EXPLOITIVE
INNOVATION
What does a firm have to do to compete on the basis of innovation? It has to
have a process for the generation of innovation, since with rapid changes in
technology, no one innovation, however revolutionary, can by itself be the basis
for a successful firm. In other words, a strategy of opportunity and innovation is
dynamic and offensive in nature, not stationary and defensive. It is a process of
creative destruction, with a stream of new innovations building on, but also
supplanting the old.12  To implement such a strategy what the firm has to do is to
appreciate what kind of innovation the new economy is looking for and find ways
of achieving it in a systematic fashion.
While innovation has been classified is a myriad of ways for different purposes
(disruptive and sustaining, product versus process and so on) to appreciate why
the new economy is driven so much by startups we must understand how innovation
11
 Wheelwright et al (2000). See also the special issue of Fast Company: Built to Flip? (March 2000).
12
 For example, EMC had so much faith in the possibilities of mainframe data storage devices, that almost a
soon as that technology become available it shut down production of memory boards, even though that business
accounted for 80% of its revenues at that time (Hemp, 2001).
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serves as the nexus between the firm’s resources and its strategy, between how
and why it does what it does. And for that purpose we introduce the distinction
between creative and exploitive innovation. The difference between these two
types of innovation in many ways defines the difference between the new and old
economies.
The purpose of exploitive innovation is to support and make the most of an
already existing product space, perhaps expanding that space, but not creating a
new one. It is based on incremental improvement to the base technology or
marketing strategy that underlies a firm’s existing products. Such innovation need
not be pursued only by the firm making the existing products—other firms may
leverage the existence of the product line, in the way that there are many vendors
of Windowsª compatible software—but clearly the incumbent is favored in this
environment.
Given that exploitive innovations are complementary to existing products,
they are likely to more rapidly become commodities sold on the basis of their cost
and quality.13 Not only must exploitive innovations then be produced cheaply, but
also they must be made backward compatible with the existing product line.
Further, there must be a clear migration path for consumers from the old to the
new technology and this path must be communicated to them. In other words,
competing using incrementally improving mature technology requires the careful
management of all the processes of a firm, since it is not the idea that counts as
much in this strategy as the entire value chain that delivers the product to its
customer base in a cost effective manner.
The imperative in the new economy, however, is being first to market, and
what is essential for a strategy of being the latest and newest is innovation that
opens up the competitive environment.  A startup can only claim a high market
valuation if it is perceived as having carved a distinct market space for itself, and
this requires more than exploitive innovation.  It is harder to avoid being perceived
as a niche player when your products are only complementary to those of
established firms, and it is more difficult to credibly compete on cost and quality
against the primary industry players who are larger and more experienced. What
new economy firms seek are not exploitive innovations, but creative innovations,
which are ones that permit the inception of a new product space, not just a
refinement of an existing one. They are not just technologies, but associated
marketing and strategy breakthroughs, which, in contrast to exploitive innovations,
13
 To the extent that the product has to fit in with existing customers’ expectations and needs, anything other
than incremental improvement is a drawback—consider the consumer backlash that Ford experienced with its
“rounded” Taurus, or Coca Cola with its infamous New Coke.
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represent a distinct step up in capability or performance, and—most important of
all—are perceived as such by customers.
Since markets are continuously in a state of flux in the new economy and
there is no need to fit into an established path, as with exploitive innovation,
entrepreneurs have greater ability to shape the potential of their creative innovation.
They can market their product as disruptive to existing products and relationships.
Unlike with exploitive innovations, the product and marketing path is not
constrained by the needs of existing customers, products and strategies. Hence,
by flexibly pursuing and seizing opportunities, entrepreneurs can take a basically
exploitive innovation and make it a creative one, with disruptive effects on existing
customer and product relationships.
The strategy of seeking and seizing the opportunity to create a market through
the use of creative innovation is a virtually defining aspect of the new economy.
While the dynamic nature of strategy today has received a great deal of attention
in the business media less thought has been given to how this strategy can be
feasibly implemented, or to how the innovation comes about in the first place.14
4. OUTSOURCING: DEMOCRATIZING COMPETITION
The basis of all technology-enabled firms in the new economy is the Internet,
and as we have argued, the unique aspect of the Internet is its leveling effect.  The
consequence of this effect is to both create new product spaces and make the ones
of established player much more vulnerable to attack through the use of a clever
creative innovation. The first and most famous example of this phenomenon is
still the best, of how in the book selling business a century long strategy of
consolidation by Barnes and Noble to become the country’s largest bookseller
was rendered worthless virtually overnight by Jeff Bezos’s insight that books
were the ideal product for e-commerce. The pervasiveness of the Internet, and
creative use of its capabilities, such as reader reviews and search capabilities,
allowed Amazon to completely overwhelm Barnes and Noble’s incumbency
advantage, with a fraction of its resources and none of its experience.15
However, just having that creative idea would not have guaranteed success
for Amazon.com. Not so long ago, a challenger to Barnes and Noble could not
14
 Contrast our classification of innovation into those that are exploitive and creative with the concept of
“Disruptive Innovations” and “Sustaining Innovations” popularized by Clayton Christensen (Christensen,
1997). More analysis of this issue is provided by Alles (2001). Leifer et al (2000) provides yet another
categorization of innovation and the way that firms can foster it.
15
 Ghemawat and Baird (2000).
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have credibly competed with it without replicating its physical assets—its hundreds
of stores and warehouses. At its inception, though, Amazon could not have afforded
to build a single facility as impressive as any local Barnes and Noble superstore,
which would have doomed it if the way to attract customers was by providing
comparable “bricks and mortar” storefronts, or the warehouses that comprise a
bookstores back office.
Just because a startup can cheaply create a website that is as attractive as that
of an older and larger firm, does not mean that it can successfully compete against
it in the long run. The goods still have to be built and delivered. This is where the
second great force in the new economy enters: the ability to outsource virtually
all business processes. This is not true in all places and for all types of startups,
but it is a distinguishing feature of Silicon Valley and increasingly so in such
Silicon Valley‘“wannabes” as Austin, Texas and Silicon Alley in New York. In
these centers of innovation, the infrastructure exists for startups to outsource almost
all the activities and functions necessary to develop a going concern, from
administration and human resource management to manufacturing. Federal
Express and UPS take over delivery with unparalleled order tracking capabilities.
Venture capital firms offer not just financing but management support and
oversight, with experienced managers on retainer to fill the needs of their clients.
ASPs and “technology on tap” providers allow firms to “externalize” their business
software needs—which in this information age, means almost all of their business
processes—while OEMs take over the manufacturing function. With all parties
integrated through Supply Chain Management, the ability exists today to create a
“virtual corporation” with even a “virtual CEO”.16
One outcome of outsourcing processes rather than developing them internally
is the substitution of a variable cost for an upfront fixed cost. Per-unit cost of
outsourcing may be higher than for an internally run process but that consideration
only matters if the strategy of the firm is to compete on cost. For most high-tech
startups, though, the strategic imperative is to get to market first and to compete
by offering innovative features not available elsewhere. Hence cost is a secondary
concern and more than offset by a major benefit of outsourcing, almost infinite
scalability. That allows even a new startup to have the credibility of an established
firm.17
16
 Cross (1995), Lacity, Willcocks and Feeny (1995), Roberts and Tempest (1999). See also “Ignore the Label,
It’s Flextronics Inside: Outsourcing’s New Cachet in Silicon Valley”, New York Times (February 15, 2001)
and “Technology on Tap”, Business Week (June 19th, 2000, pp. 74-87).
17
 See “Building to Scale”, Newsweek (E-Life Special Issue, pp. 45-52, July 2000).
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Outsourcing is just one example of a fundamental shift in how firms carry out
their business. It is a natural extension of the idea from the 1980’s that each firm
needs to develop and focus on its core competencies.18 All else is “context” and
while execution of that context is essential for the generation of profits, it cannot
draw scarce management attention away from the primary focus on the firms’
core functions. Moreover, the insight that business has gained recently is that
while a function may be context for it, it is the core competence of another, more
specialized firm. Thus by outsourcing a firm can obtain best practice performance
in all functions, core and context, leveraging an innovation into a marketable
product.19 Eventually relationships across firms will grow and deepen until there
is created what Tapscott, Ticoll and Lowy (2000) call B-webs: “internetworked,
fluid—sometimes highly structured, sometimes amorphous—sets of contributors
[that] come together to create value for customers and wealth for their
shareholders. In the most elegant of b-webs, each participant focuses on a limited
set of core competencies, the things that it does best.”20
In particular, the key core competency that startups need to focus on in the
new economy is their ability to innovate. Indeed, in many cases, that is all that
they can do well, considering the age and experience of the entrepreneurs. Such
limitations would have doomed an old economy firm where translating the
innovation into a full value chain was more important than the idea itself. In that
environment, a startup would not even have been able to raise funding in the first
place without the assurance that it could itself perform all the activities needed to
run a large firm—obviously something of a Catch-22 hurdle for an entrepreneur.
What aspects of a business should be outsourced and which processes should be
retained internally to develop the firm’s core competency remains open issues,
but there is no doubt that outsourcing is one of the most powerful tools ever
developed to help entrepreneurs take on and defeat larger and older competitors.
Of course, the market meltdown has led some people to abandon their faith in
outsourcing as with much else in the new economy.21 It has been pointed out that
outsourcing is not as cheap as it first appeared, when, for instance, suppliers would
take payment in stock options. But the main effect of outsourcing is not in cutting
costs, but in giving firms something far more valuable in today’s economy: speed,
credibility and flexibility. And as far as cost is concerned, it is true that it turned
out that dotcoms had to spend many millions more than anticipated to purchase
18
 Prahalad and Hamel (1990).
19
 Moore (2000).
20
 See also Moore (1993).
21
 Young and Macneil (1999).
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infrastructure. But such costs still pale into insignificance when compared to the
capital costs considered routine in old economy firms. For example, in the late
1990’s Gillette spent nearly one billion dollars in developing its Mach 3 razor
blade.22 Imagine what could have been done with such an amount of money in
Silicon Valley during that same time period.
5. FROM ASSETS AND PROCESSES TO PEOPLE
Taken together, the leveling effect of the Internet and process outsourcing
underpinned the tremendous success of startup firms in the new economy. They
could credibly seek financing to compete head to head with larger and older firms,
without being intimidated by their incumbency advantages. It is particularly
striking to compare the virtual structure of the new economy firm with what was
considered, only a few short years ago, to be essential for a firm’s success: the
physical resources and assets that it owns and the processes in place for using
them. Michael Porter (1996, page 62), the dean of strategy for old economy firms,
argued that the source of competitive advantage for firms is how effectively they
perform “the hundreds of activities required to create, produce, sell, and deliver
their products and services, such as calling on customers, assembling final
products, and training employees.” The popularity of such techniques as Business
Process Reengineering, Activity Based Management and Best Practice
Benchmarking in the 1990’s illustrates the importance in old economy firms of
controlling processes in order to be able to cost effectively produce high quality
output. An emphasis on processes and assets clearly favors larger and more
established firms. The necessity to perform internal activities with great efficiency
reflects the greater likelihood that old economy firms compete on the provision
of high quality products or services at the lowest possible cost. In other words,
these firms produce commodity like items that they have to differentiate in some
fashion from the output of their competitors.
Most new economy firms, however, are attempting to be the first to market
with a creative innovation and cost and quality are of secondary concern. This is
true of even such large, established new economy firms as Microsoft or Cisco,
whose products are considered largely unique. Few high-end servers for instance,
are bought purely on the basis of cost, while issues such as compatibility dominate
software purchase decisions. Optimizing processes is of secondary importance in
this strategic environment, compared to the management of the human resources
that give rise to innovation.
22
 BusinessWeek (February 1st, 1999).
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Consequently, the fundamental effect of adopting a strategy of opportunity,
of having low barriers to entry and the ability to outsource in the new economy is
to shift the source of value generation in firms from assets and processes to people,
from physical to human capital.23 It has been frequently demonstrated in the digital
economy that a few talented people can develop and execute a business that
completely transforms an industry and overturns existing competitors, or develop
a vastly lucrative market that never existed before. That is almost the mythical
view of the startup, as evidenced by the success of such firms as Amazon.com,
Cisco, Priceline.com and Yahoo. These are not isolated examples, however, but
reflections of a new reality in the way that businesses compete.
By contrast, in the old economy in which assets and processes in place were
the means of competition, the role of the worker was very different. When
managing processes, firms aim for control and stability through standardization
and the elimination of uncertainty. The assumption is that that there is one optimal
way of processing inputs into outputs and the object is to work towards attaining
that ideal. In this environment human variability results in inconsistency, and is
to be compensated for, not celebrated. Hence processes are carefully constructed
to allow the company to act independently of its workers since reliability and cost
effectiveness cannot be achieved if the process is dependent upon the particular
workers available at any given time. As Christensen and Overdorf (2000, page
71) state: “at highly successful firms, like McKinsey & Company, the processes
and values have become so powerful that it almost doesn’t matter which people
get assigned to which project teams. Hundreds of MBAs join the firm every year,
and almost as many leave. But the firm is able to crank out high-quality work
year after year because its core capabilities are rooted in processes and values
rather that in its [human] resources.” This is the embodiment of a strategy driven
emphasis on process over people.24
To illustrate the difference in the role of people and processes between the
old economy and the new, consider a classic old economy firm like General Motors.
It obviously has many talented engineers, but over many decades few have left to
found or join startups. One reason is that it is almost absurd to suggest such a
thing as a startup in the automobile industry. The initial cost to be even a supplier
to that industry, let alone to be a full-fledged auto manufacturer, is exceedingly
23
 Benson (1999) examines the effect of outsourcing on the flexibility and productivity of workers. Shane
(2001) discusses the forces leading to the creation of technology firms.
24
 The ultimate example of the supremacy of assets over people in the old economy took place at the end of the Second
World War. In compensation for the destruction of its industrial base, Russia dismantled and shipped back home
thousands of factories from the defeated Germany. Clearly the plants and equipment were considered the critical part
of the production process, not the people who operated them.
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high. Indeed, there have been virtually no new car manufacturers created anywhere
in the world in the last few decades. Having an idea for a better car is simply not
enough to be viable as a startup: Cars are essentially a commodity item within
their particular market niche and the processes that existing automobile
manufactures have set up to wring out excess costs while achieving high quality
would be very difficult, costly and time consuming for an entrant to replicate.
It is instructive that when employees of old economy firms do leave, their
most common new job is that of consultant—in other words, they continue to act
as virtual employees of their old firms and their job is to try and improve those
firms, rather than supplant them. The way in which workers are of value in the
old economy is by being complementary to the physical assets and processes in
place at the established companies.
Startups, on the other hand, would cease to exist in the absence of their key
founders and staff.  More to the point, their strategies preclude an emphasis on
processes at the expense of people, because flexibility is key to their success.
Unlike physical assets and processes that are designed to do one thing very well,
people are more flexible and capable of innovation.25 The most important flexibility
that talented workers demonstrate is the ability to take an exploitive innovation
and make it creative. Such a capability to be flexible is especially valuable when
combined with the first aspect of the new economy, that it is relatively easier now
to translate ideas into an operational business.
In short, a key difference between old and new economy firms is that the
source of value in startups is the talent and creativity of its workers and that the
constraints on rapidly and credibly implementing the business plan are lowered
relative to old economy standards. The importance of workers over processes or
assets in the new economy was demonstrated by the amounts that firms like Cisco
were willing to pay for small startups that consisted mainly of the former and
possessed little of the latter. What Cisco was really buying in these acquisitions
was a pre-assembled “gene pool” of scarce workers.26 The premium that Cisco
paid for its acquisitions was a reflection of the opportunity cost of workers’ time:
they needed to be given a reason to work on this project in this firm, rather than in
one of the many alternatives then open to them. This opportunity cost is clearly
higher in areas dense with alternatives, which can be geographic areas like Silicon
Valley, or functional areas where talent is scarce, such as in networking. While
the opportunity cost may have fallen during the current downturn, the general
25
 See Upton (1995), and in particular, MacCormack, Verganti and Iansiti (2001).
26
 Wheelwright et al (2001). See also Bunnell (2000).
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principle remains that today it is the ability of workers to drive innovation that
determines firm success.
A reflection of this fact is the development over the last few years of the new
field of knowledge management.27 But while it is a clear strategic necessity for
firms to try and separate knowledge from the workers that possess it as way of
leveraging and preserving it, ultimately the issue is how that store of knowledge
is used and transformed into creative innovation.
6. MANAGING A FIRM IN THE OPPORTUNITY
ECONOMY
The forces that shape the new economy—an opportunistic strategy of seeking
new markets by the use of creative innovation, outsourcing context and the shift
from asset to people—are essential for each other and reinforce each other’s effects.
Thus a strategy of being first to market cannot exist if there is no space for creative
innovation to take root. Startups cannot focus on creative innovation if they cannot
outsource context. Outsourcing, SCM and the development of B-webs open up
fresh strategic opportunities for firms to service the needs of the new economy, so
feeding a strategy of competing by innovation.28
Few firms, though, can be confident that they have fully internalized all these
forces. Established firms, in particular, face an acute problem in that their need to
change to a strategy of opportunity is much more urgent than their ability to bring
about the internal changes needed to support such a strategy. They have to go
through the uncertain and expensive process of change management to align their
existing processes and people to the new strategy, while a startup that can follow
a clean sheet approach. With their culture revolving around the use of assets and
processes to achieve exploitive innovation, it is much harder for established firms
to put in place the cultures and control systems that focus on creative innovation
and the people who bring it about.
What all firms, either new or established, have to aim for is consistency across
the fundamental forces that shape the new economy. In particular, how they do
things has to match what they want to do and why they do it. In this respect, the
most profound change represented by the new economy is in the shift in value
creation from processes to people. It is the failure to internalize the full implications
27
 Hansen, Nohria and Tierney (1999). See also the special issue on knowledge management in Journal of
Management Information Systems, (2000) Vol.18, n.1.
28
 Tapscott, Ticoll and Lowy (2000).
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of this fundamental paradigm shift that creates the greatest difficulties for managers
implementing the new economy business model.29
6.1. Rethinking Worker Valuation: Real Options
The fact that the value generating capability of a startup lies in its workers
rather than in its physical assets or processes implies that these new economy
firms cannot be valued in the same way as old economy firms. What distinguished
workers from physical assets is their ability to learn and expand their capabilities.
In the fast moving world of high technology, it is not current skills that matter, but
the ability to change as circumstances dictate. That flexibility is the essence of a
real option and recognizing that fact is another key towards understanding the
dynamics of the new economy.
Recall that the value of a real [call] option is decreasing in the exercise price
and increasing in its variance and asset price.30 The former corresponds to the
cost of the investment needed to purchase the asset in a good state, and as we
have argued, this cost is relatively low in the new economy. The variability of the
option corresponds to the capability of the startup to rapidly alter its plans as
circumstances change, and that is a feature of the new economy, because the
source of value is flexible people, unlike in the old economy with its reliance on
less flexible processes and physical assets. Real options have far greater value
than the net present value of a stable set of cash flows, which goes some way
towards explaining the very high valuation of startups that have little other than a
team of workers. This is not a case of market failure or “irrational exuberance”,
but rather a valid recognition of from where value is derived in the new economy.
The option theory also helps explain why, at the height of the boom, entrepreneurs
were able to raise large sums of venture capital money without an iron clad business
plan, or sometimes, with only the expectation that a business plan will follow
subsequently (funding at the “cocktail napkin” stage). When a VC perceives a real
option element to the team, the initial business idea that brings the team together is
less important than what it can do once assembled. The team’s option value remains
even if the initial business plan fails and so venture capitalists gain from keeping
the startup going to see what else develops. There are fewer physical resources on
hand that constrain what the startup can do next and there are lower barriers in the
new economy to translating that potential value into practice. It is also not surprising
29
 See also Leifer et al (2000), O’Reilly and Pfeffer (2000) and Hamel (2000) for further discussion of how
management and personnel practices have to change in the new economy.
30
 Dixit and Pindyck (1995), Edleson (1999).
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then, that post-investment, investors give startups in the new economy a great deal
of leeway to alter their original business plan, sometimes beyond recognition, when
it proves inadequate, rather than liquidating the company and moving on. On the
face of it, such behavior does not make sense. After all, the money already invested
is a sunk cost, so logically the new business plan should be on an equal footing with
all other opportunities. But once the option value of the workers in place is
recognized, it makes sense to stick with the team at hand, since it is the very ability
to change plans that is of value in the first place.31
However, there is also a price to be paid for a valuation model based on real
options: far greater volatility as underlying assumptions change. Unlike for a
traditional firm valued using stable discounted cash flows, valuations of new
economy firms are based less on extrapolations of current results and more on
expectations of what market spaces the firm’s creative innovation will be able to
open up and how much that space is likely to be worth.32 In other words, the
valuation is based on the market’s beliefs as to the ability of the managers of the
firm to successfully create an innovation and translate it into profits. The fact that
in the new economy the market is willing to base its valuation on the basis of the
real option element of the firm’s talent means that a startup can raise more cash at
an earlier stage. But the flip side of that opportunity is that options are a far less
solid basis of valuation than current cash flows, and if the market’s faith in the
firm wavers then the reduction in value is rapid and dramatic. The same forces
apply to established firms that attempt to enter the new economy through creative
innovation. They will find that their stock prices also become more volatile than
they used to be, as the market shifts their basis of valuing the firm from cash
flows to the opportunity cost of its innovations and its human resources.
Real option based valuation is then a two-edged sword that provides new
economy firms with both great opportunities and great perils. Both outcomes are
exacerbated when the market is driven by a herd mentality rather than a systematic
case-by-case assessment of the business plans of each individual firm. Rather
than dismissing the current market volatility as a sign of market failure, though,
new economy managers must recognize that it is simply a reflection of fundamental
changes in the way business are run, and so, of how they are valued.
31
 “On the Internet, companies have to be ready to change goals or strategies virtually overnightÉ Some
companies are writing and rewriting their strategies every quarter, or even every week—or else. ‘It used to be
that the big ate the small’, says Geoff Yang, a partner in the Menlo Park, Calif. Venture-capital firm IVP/
Redpoint Ventures. ‘Now the fast eat the slow.’” BusinessWeek (November 1st, 1999, page EB 52).
32
 Moore (2000, Chapter 2).
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6.2. Retaining and Rewarding Workers
One of the prominent characteristics of this new economy is the inability of
many firms to keep the workers who generate creative innovations from leaving
to market them on their own. There has been a great deal of discussion about how
established firms can develop a more entrepreneur friendly climate internally.
Hamel (1999) argues, for instance, that firms need to “Bring Silicon Valley Inside”.
But the fact remains that at even the most successful companies, the best employees
still dream of the day when they can leave and do a startup of their own.
Workers have developed a keen awareness of the opportunity cost of their
time. There was a time when leaving an established company to join a startup was
considered a risky course of action. Even with the current recession, however,
there is little doubt that there has been cultural shift in the attitudes of young
employees, who feel that it is not leaving and so not “getting in on the action” that
is considered the ultimate risk. In other words, their opportunity cost is perceived
to be greater from staying than from going, and that attitude will undoubtedly
reassert itself once the job market recovers. Adding to that incentive is the fact
that the market seems to reward workers who have demonstrated the initiative to
attempt a more entrepreneurial career if they wish to ever go back to an established
firm. And why is that? Because someone who has self-selected to be part of an
entrepreneurial effort is seen as more likely to be able to contribute towards the
development of creative innovation.
Losing a reputation for creative innovation creates a downward spiral for
attracting and retaining talented staff. Indeed, supportive technology positions
are increasingly staffed only by workers who cannot leave for startups, such as
those with limited immigration status or workers with weaker resumes.33 Why do
creative workers go to startups rather than remaining with larger employers? The
trite answer is that workers feel that it is a way of obtaining far greater wealth
than they could if they remained with a larger, more established firm. We have
already discussed why startups are able to obtain such high valuations from
investors—the recognition of their option value. The real issue then, is why existing
firms are unable to match the incentives provided by startups. One hypothesis is
that they have no reason to do so: that the startups are pursuing new ventures
unrelated and of no interest to the established firm. However, that explanation is
contradicted by the frequent acquisition of startups by established firms. It is also
far more likely that experienced workers will more readily perceive opportunities
33
 “The Streets Are Paved With PC’s: Wall Street and Silicon Alley Lure a New Breed of High-Tech Immigrants.”
The New York Times (August 16, 1998).
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in their own industry and be in a better position to develop creative innovations in
their personal area of expertise, than outside it. The fact that the acquiring firm
pays the high market valuation of the startup also suggests that the problem is not
one of an inability to afford to match the rewards that startups offer workers.
We argue that the reason why firms are unable to retain the workers who are
the source of critical creative innovations is because their managers have failed to
recognize the defining forces of the new economy: the option value of workers,
the shift from processes to people and indeed, the importance of creative innovation
in the first place. Hamel (1999, page 77) offers the following anecdote: “Two
years ago, the CEO of one of America’s large information technology companies
approached me with a simple question: ‘What will it take for my company to
capture a bigger chunk of Internet-related opportunities?’ ‘For starters,’ I replied,
‘a willingness to create a slew of 30-year-old millionaires.’ The CEO furrowed
his brow and said, ‘I can’t see us doing that.’ Not surprisingly, his company has
missed the Internet bonanza.” It is quite apparent that most firms have not been
willing to pay their talented workers what the workers think that they can get
from leaving and joining a startup. Our model suggests an explanation for why.
It is not surprising that old economy managers find it difficult to “create a
slew of millionaires” amongst their employees because in the old economy few
employees were that valuable. When implementing a strategy based on exploitive
innovation, the key sources of value are the processes that translate incremental
and systematic improvements in well-known technologies and methodologies into
cost effective products. Exploitive innovation has to be achieved in a predictably
reliable and scheduled fashion since its purpose is to upgrade existing product
lines. Hence, the process of exploitive innovation is one of those that have to be
made independent of the particular employees working on it at any given time.
Firms cannot afford the risk of having expected improvements to their product
lines held hostage to any particular worker’s contribution. This is very much an
environment in which process and assets in place—that includes, first and foremost,
the very valuable asset of the existing product space—takes precedence over the
contribution of any one worker.
A firm’s Human Resources system would not be a well-designed strategic
control system if it did not reflect this reality. When processes are the critical
component for firm success, the worth of workers will be judged relative to the
fact that they are only one input into a broader production function that also includes
the firm’s physical assets and processes. The main sources of value are the firm’s
processes and assets and so workers cannot expect to receive the bulk of the
returns resulting from their use of them. HR’s goal is to hire the right person to
work with the firm’s established processes and make effective use of its’ assets.
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While the extent of a worker’s contribution is obviously a function of their ability,
ultimately it is the contribution, not the ability, which is rewarded.
This approach to evaluating and rewarding workers is logical and appropriate
for performance evaluation in most large firms. But what this process is not
designed to do is to evaluate the worth of an employee who is contemplating
leaving to develop a creative innovation of his or her own, even when that idea is
of obvious value to the firm and related to its product strategy. The fact that in the
new economy the worker is no longer an interchangeable input into the production
function but is rather a unique free agent with an option value is difficult to reconcile
with the standard performance evaluation mentality.
The key point is that in the old economy most ideas could not be exploited
outside an established company. Even if the innovation was creative rather than
exploitive, the costs of developing the idea were so large as to preclude most startups
from becoming a credible competitor, especially at a time when there was far less
opportunity to practice outsourcing. Exploitive innovation is generic and needs the
resources of a large firm to be marketable. It is inevitable that a perspective that an
employee is but one input in a set of assets and processes, all of which are necessary
for success, will affect the way in which the firm perceives its workers and assesses
how they should be rewarded for their innovative ideas. It becomes difficult for
human resource processes to give due weight to an idea itself, relative to the role
that the firm’s processes and assets will play in its exploitation, or for that matter,
the role that they played in its development in the first place.
The dominant theory underlying human resource management and incentive
pay, the principal/agent model, perpetuates this process-oriented perspective. It
states that the level of incentive pay is a function of the worker’s marginal
productivity when using the firm’s physical resources and process. The worker’s
own potential value independent of the firm only appears through the worker’s
“reservation wage”. The presumption is that the alternative to working with this
company is working in an equivalent job in a comparable company.34 There is no
recognition that the alternative might be being an entrepreneur in a startup. In that
case the alternative valuation of workers is not based on how much they can
contribute as part of a similar production process, but on how successful they are
likely to be when developing the creative innovation on their own. Since the costs
of developing a creative innovation in the new economy are lower than that of an
34
 See Lambert (2001) for a survey of the principal/agent literature. Oyer (2000) is one of the very few papers that
have paid attention to what the “reservation wage” actually represents, rather than simply taking it as an exogenous
parameter. A more typical definition of a reservation wage is that it is the agent’s “next-best opportunity [from]
taking employment with someone else.” Baron and Kreps (1999, page 566, emphasis added).
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exploitive innovation in the old, the opportunity cost of the worker is severely
underestimated as a result of not recognizing the option component of the worker’s
entrepreneurial prospects. In the new economy it is precisely their option value
that workers wish to be rewarded for, in recognition of the fact that their ideas are
the real drivers of value.
Even when managers of old economy firms become aware that the rules have
changed, psychologically and culturally it is difficult to give workers rewards
commensurate with their option value. In particular, old economy firms face issues
of internal equity of pay, a constraint not faced in a startup. Even if management
is willing to reward a worker for his or her option value and not just as input into
a broad production process, fellow employees may perceive that as favoritism or
be subject to envy if they are not as innovative or flexible. More to the point, both
managers and other workers are familiar with an exploitive innovation environment
in which workers are interchangeable and so have roughly equal worth. Pay equity
is a natural consequence of this setting and it is hard to overcome this belief and
expectation that no one worker should be paid all that more than another.
In contrast to established firms, the startup market is keenly aware of the
forces shaping the new economy. What an outsider, such as a venture capitalist,
can do more easily than the firm, is to divorce the idea from the process and give
due recognition to the human capital that underlies it. By contrast, the firm is
always looking through the lens of the role that the assets and processes of the
firm will play in transformation of the idea into value.
6.3. Management Control in the New Economy
The radical and fascinatingly novel business model that underlies the new
economy firm has implications for all aspects of a firm’s operations. While many
have talked about the new strategies emerging in the new economy, far fewer
have focused on whether the day to day tools of management—budgets, pay for
performance, discounted cash flow—in use for the last half century retain their
relevance. But it is worth remembering that all these management techniques
developed at a time when the basis of value creation was physical assets. For
example, the primary rationale for accounting is the safeguarding of the firm’s
property and all the tools that it has developed, from budgeting to activity based
costing, are designed to serve that purpose.35  Most critical of all, labor had to be
35
 “Accounting Controls are defined as the plan of the organization and all methods and procedures that are
concerned with the safeguarding of assets and the reliability of financial records.” Roehl-Anderson and Bragg
(2000, page 12); “Cost accounting measures and reports financial and other information related to the
acquisition or consumption of an organization’s resources.” Horngren, Foster and Datar (2000, page 18).
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tightly controlled, being seen as a source of undesirable variation at best, and of
slacking, theft and sabotage at worst.
The downturn has led many to now call for new economy firms to adopt
traditional control systems as a way of achieving profitability faster and keeping
burn rates under control. While there is an undoubted need for greater efficiency,
the reliance on these old standbys of management control demonstrate that despite
the talk about “putting people first” many managers fail to understand the different
business model underlying the new economy. Their emphasis on people is really a
reaction to the tight labor market and not because they recognize that people and
not assets are the new sources of value creation in firms. If they did, they would see
that all aspects of management have to be altered to reflect that paradigm shift.
Clearly compensation is the first area that has to be looked at. But there is also need
to increased the use of real option technology in capital budgeting as well as to
revise assumptions about budgeting, control, empowerment and performance
evaluation to reflect the shift from assets to people. For example, it is encouraging
that many firms are now adopting Balanced Scorecards that give some weight to
worker learning and development, along with traditional financial metrics.36
A novel management tool just coming into use in Silicon Valley is something
whose rationale could have been predicted from the opportunity economy business
model. That is the “spin-in” in which a firm in effect acts as a VC to its own
employees. Rather than risk them leaving to form their own startup, a firm allows
a group of employees to form and develop their innovation in-house. The firm
promises to pay them essentially what they could have got if they carried out a
successful IPO, but it retains the exclusive rights to the innovation.37 This is a
very expensive procedure for a firm and raises serious issues of pay equity, even
in a Silicon Valley firm. But firms such as Cisco feel that they have no choice but
to adopt such novel management tools in response to the reality of an economy
where it is worker talent that drives firm success, and not the assets and resources
of the firm itself. Cisco spin-ins now generates most of their revenue and potential
for growth, but they have also caused resentment amongst employees not chosen
to participate in a spin-in.
The spin-in is only one example of the new tools that managers will have to
come up with as they start to fully appreciate the new business model that underlies
the new economy. It is not sufficient to pay lip service to the notion of a people
based firm. Despite all the talk, few firms paid any greater regard for their
36
 Kaplan and Norton (1996).
37
 This discussion based on private communication between Cisco executives and the authors. The full details
of how spin-in are structured at Cisco are confidential.
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employees in the first new economy recession than they did in the last, old economy
one. The rationale for a layoff, after all, is that it is the firm’s capital that must be
safeguarded for a future recovery, as the ultimate source of profits, while workers
are interchangeable and a variable cost that can be adjusted at will. Until firms
start “laying off” assets instead, it cannot be said that they have truly recognized
and internalized what it means to have the source of value creation shift from
asset and processes to people.
7. ECONOMIES OF SKILLS
The new economy was not just a set of brash young firms with cool technology.
It was more than a happy confluence of entrepreneurs and “irrationally exuberant”
investors. It was and remains a comprehensive, consistent, integrated, self-
reinforcing and self-perpetuating revolution in the very essence of what it means
to be a business—of why firms exist, how they are run and what it takes for them
to succeed. At its base is technological change, but what that technology looks
like is less important than what it makes possible: a fundamental democratization
of business, allowing startups to compete on level terms with the largest and most
established firms. Not just technology is responsible for this, but also the ability
to outsource virtually all business processes and so quickly achieve credibility
and scale.
The effect of these two forces is to shift the strategy space from the exploitation
of existing products to the development of creative new innovations. As a
consequence, there is a correspondingly fundamental shift in the basis of value
creation in firms, from processes and physical assets to human resources—to
smart people. And when the flexibility that innovative people posses becomes the
driving force in the economy, new ways of measuring their contribution must be
used that recognizes their inherent option value. In this environment what you
can do is more important than what you have done, your potential more valuable
than your assets: in short, an economy keenly aware of its opportunity cost.
Commenting on the popularity of Applications Service Providers, Mr. Kneko
Burney of Cahners In-Stat states that “Today, it’s not about economies of scale
but about economies of skill.”38 In its recognition of the fundamental need in the
New Economy to leverage the value creating capacity of human resources, this
description is even more general than its author may realize. It is the very essence
of the Opportunity Economy.
38
 New York Times (May 22nd, 2000).
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